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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the impact of Bad Debt Loss Insurance
on settlement outcomes. A huge success in a settlement or trial can
turn into a disaster when the defendant goes bankrupt before paying
the plaintiff’s claim. “Rainmakers” face the following dilemma: the
greater the success, the greater the defendant’s bankruptcy risk. The
starting point of our paper is a simple trial and litigation model with
perfect and complete information. We add the possibility of a defen-
dant’s bankruptcy, and of buying Bad Debt Loss Insurance for both
the settlement and the trial stage. We demonstrate that trial insur-
ance and settlement insurance have different impacts on the predicted
outcome of settlement negotiations. Trial insurance tends to increase
the settlement result; therefore, it generates a contract rent for the
insurer and the insured. Settlement insurance, however, may have the
opposite effect, as it decreases the settlement result.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes what impact Bad Debt Loss Insurance (BDLI) may have
on the trial and settlement behavior of litigants. BDLI covers the creditor’s
loss if the debtor goes bankrupt before he pays the debt. A typical BDLI
case takes place in three stages: In stage one, the creditor delivers a good
and now expects the due payment to take place in stage three. However, it
is possible that the debtor goes bankrupt in stage two, i.e., before acquitting
his debt. If a BDLI contract has been made before stage 1, then the insurer
covers (a part of) the creditor’s loss.
In this paper, we replace the delivery stage (one) by trial and settlement.
The principle of BDLI is not limited to delivery contracts. Claims can also
arise from other types of interaction. E.g., a plaintiff who has won a legal
dispute may as well lead face the risk that the defendant goes bankrupt
before the payment is due. In a dispute about contractual obligations, or an
accident, one party typically demands an amount of money from the other,
and threatens to go to court. Before the trial takes place, the parties may
negotiate a settlement.
Such a dispute may have three different outcomes. In two of them, when
the plaintiff prevails in court, or when he concludes a settlement, he obtains
a legally enforceable claim against the defendant. If the defendant does
not pay immediately, he might declare bankruptcy before the plaintiff can
collect the money. Ironically, the bankruptcy risk may increase with the
compensation adjudged by the court (or the settlement result). This is what
we call a “rainmaker’s dilemma”. A landslide victory may turn into a disaster
if the defendant goes bankrupt, as this dramatically decreases the amount a
succesfull plaintiff can collect.1
The bad surprise may even be greater under the British cost allocation rule.
This rule allows the prevailing plaintiff to claim reimbursement for his liti-
gation costs from his opponent. If, however, the latter goes bankrupt, then
even a prevailing plaintiff has to bear his own costs (in addition to the full
amount of court fees). Hence, the risk of defendant’s bankruptcy may dra-
1This is the subject of the novel “The Rainmaker” by John Grisham (1996): A young
lawyer has achieved an enormous award in his first trial, but did not collect any money,
since the defendant went bankrupt after the trial.
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matically decrease the expected value of a trial award. A similar risk awaits
the plaintiff if he concludes a settlement. If the plaintiff faces the risk of
the defendant going bankrupt, then the expected value of the agreed upon
settlement award is smaller than in a world without bankruptcy risk.
BDLI covers the outstanding money if a debtor declares bankruptcy. Hence,
we apply this idea to claims out of trial awards on the one hand, and to
settlement results on the other hand. We analyze the strategic impacts these
two types of insurance have on the settlement outcome. We define as “trial
insurance” a BDLI that covers the plaintiff’s claim after having prevailed in
court. In the same vein, we define as “settlement insurance” a BDLI which
covers the risk of a defendant’s bankruptcy after a settlement agreement.
At first glance, the bankruptcy risks for trial and settlement appear to be
similar. However, it is surprising that insurers in reality only offer trial
insurance, while settlement insurance seems to be non-existent.
The model presented here allows for a separate analysis of the impact trial
and settlement insurance have on the settlement result (according to the
symmetric Nash bargaining solution).2 We derive that settlement insurance
fails to create a mutual benefit for the insurer and the plaintiff, when both
sides of the BDLI contract are risk-neutral. This would explain the non-
existence of settlement insurance. Contrary to this, trial insurance creates a
mututal benefit for the plaintiff and the insurer, which may explain why this
type of BDLI can be found in reality. In the terminology of Kirstein (2000),
trial insurance is a strategic insurance as it improves the strategic situation
between plaintiff and defendant to the benefit of the former, rather than a
device for risk-allocation.3 The driving force of strategic insurance is the
modification of the plaintiff’s threat point in settlement negotiations.4 The
consequence of such a strategic move is an exploitation of the defendant.
Hence, strategic insurance creates a cooperation rent between insurer and
plaintiff even if both parties are risk-neutral.
2See Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) for the applicability of this axiomatic
approach to non-cooperative games.
3See also Velthoeven and van Wijck (2001). Seog (2006) has applied a similar approach
to Cournot oligopolists.
4Kirstein and Rickman (2004) present a model which also allows the plaintiff to increase
his threat points by a strategic move prior to settlement negotiations.
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Only a few papers have presented general analyses of BDLI. Thakor (1982)
proposes that BDLI may serve as a signal to overcome lemons market prob-
lems. The insurer, as a third party between borrower and lender, produces
informative signals. Borrowers can thereby signal their default probability to
lenders.5 The theory according to which the purchase of BDLI constitutes a
valid signal to borrowers was, however, questioned by Hsueh and Li (1990).
This stream of literature is, however, not concerned with the strategic effect
of BDLI explained above, which is the topic of our paper.
In section 2, we present a simple litigation model with perfect and complete
information that consists of a settlement and a trial stage.6 Furthermore, we
add the possibility of bankruptcy to both stages. In section 3, the trial stage
is analyzed, with and without trial insurance. We derive the conditions under
which the threat to sue is credible or not. Section 4 presents the analysis
of the settlement stage. Here we demonstrate the effect of bankruptcy and
settlement insurance on the symmetric Nash bargaining solution.
2 Outline of the model
We consider a simple model in which a plaintiff (P) and a defendant (D)
negotiate a pre-trial settlement. If the parties fail to reach an agreement,
the plaintiff may proceed to trial, in which case a judge decides the dispute
with an exogenously given probability (denoted as β) in favor of the plaintiff.
Thus, the dispute may lead to one out of four possible outcomes:
1. a settlement agreement,
2. the plaintiff drops the case,
3. the plaintiff prevails in court,
4. the plaintiff loses in court.
5This signaling effect has been empirically estimated by Kidwell, Sorensen and Wa-
chowicz (1987).
6This helps to keep the model tractable. Moreover, we limit our view to one-stage
settlement games. For multi-stage games, see Spier (1994) as well as Daughety and Rein-
ganum (2004).
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If the parties conclude a settlement, or if the plaintiff prevails in court, he
obtains a legally enforceable claim against the defendant (either the settle-
ment result, denoted S, or the amount at stake, which we denote as Y > 0).
We assume that the actual value of the defendant’s assets becomes known
only after this claim is established. During the game, the parties perceive the
asset value as a random variable. Its realization may turn out to be smaller
than the debt of the defendant (consisting of the plaintiff’s claim plus the
litigation cost to be borne by the defendant). In this case, the defendant has
to declare bankruptcy. To keep matters simple, we model the asset value
A as a binary random variable:7 A ∈ {0; 1} with α = Pr(A = 0), hence
(1 − α) = Pr(A = 1). All other parameters of the settlement and litigation
game are assumed to be common knowledge, including the fact whether the
plaintiff is insured. We assume the parties to be risk-neutral, i.e., they maxi-
mize their respective expected monetary income. In a bargaining game with
complete and perfect information, risk-neutral parties will always agree upon
a settlement if a bargaining range exists.
We apply the British litigation cost allocation rule,8 according to which the
losing party has to bear both sides’ litigation costs, which we denote as
C > 0. We limit our focus to the case Y +C < 1, which makes sure that the
defendant can pay all his debts if the greater asset value (A = 1) is realized.
Allowing for the possibility of a defendant’s bankruptcy adds a twist to the
British rule. If a defendant goes bankrupt after having lost in court, the
plaintiff not only has to pay both parties’ court cost, but would also receive
no reimbursement for his attorney cost.9
Figure 1 displays one of the four possible subgames of the game between P
and D, depending on P’s decision to buy BDLI. We distinguish two types
7The asset value could as well be modeled as a continuous random variable, drawn
from the interval [0, 1]. Under this approach a marginal increase of the settlement result
would also marginally increase the bankruptcy risk. However, this approach drastically
complicates the Nash bargaining model without providing additional insights.
8The whole analysis could just as well be carried out using the American cost allocation
rule. However, in the case of the British rule, the bankruptcy risk of the defendant is higher
as it also includes the defendant’s litigation cost.
9In reality, should the losing defendant go bankrupt, then the prevailing plaintiff only
has to pay his own attorney and court fees, but not his opponent’s attorney. Subsequently,
we do not distinguish between court fees and attorneys’ fees; this simplification has no
important impact on our results.
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Figure 1: Settlement and trial subgame
σ, τ P,D 
settlement
S

no settlement


N 
bankruptcy
α [π1, 0]
no bankruptcy; 1− α
[S − σfs − τft, 1− S]
P 
drop case


N
no bankruptcy; 1− α
[−C − σfs − τft, 1]
bankruptcy
α [−C − σfs − τft, 0]

trial
J


D prevails1− β


N
no bankruptcy; 1− α
[−C − σfs − τft, 1]
bankruptcy
α [−C − σfs − τft, 0]
P prevails
β
N


no bankruptcy; 1− α
[Y − σfs − τft, 1− Y − C]
bankruptcy
α [π2, 0]
of BDLI: Trial insurance covers claims out of a judicial decision, whereas
settlement insurance covers claims that originate from a pre-trial settlement.
We denote P’s decision to buy settlement insurance as σ = 1, while σ = 0
represents his decision not to buy this type of BDLI. In the same vein, we
denote his decision to buy trial insurance as τ = 1, and to abstain from it
as τ = 0. Hence, the complete game consists of four subgames. Settlement
insurance costs a fee fs ≥ 0, trial insurance costs ft ≥ 0.
Each of the four subgames starts with settlement negotiations between P
and D. To derive the settlement result S ∈ IR, we apply the symmetric Nash
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bargaining solution. We can safely limit our view to cases where 0 < S < 1,
and we assume bargaining to be costless. In Figure 1, the small square
labeled P denotes the plaintiff’s decision node, while the large square labeled
P,D denotes the Nash bargaining stage. All circles labeled N or J denote
chance moves. If the parties agree upon a settlement result, nature draws
the random value of D’s asset. If A = 1 is realized, then the asset value
exceeds the settlement result, which occurs with a probability of 1 − α. In
this case D pays the agreed-upon amount to P and the game ends. If the
realization of the asset value is zero (with probability α), then it is insufficient
to cover the agreed-upon payment and D’s payoff is zero.
P’s payoff in this case is denoted π1 and depends on whether or not he has
bought a settlement insurance. If he is not insured (σ = 0), then gains
nothing out of the settlement negotiations. In this case, his payoff accrues to
−τft (if he has trial insurance, he only has to pay that fee). If the plaintiff
holds a settlement insurance (σ = 1), then he receives the settlement result
S as a reimbursement from the insurer. Hence we have π1 = σ(S − fs)− τft
at the endnode in the lower right corner of the subgame tree.
When the parties fail to agree upon a settlement, then P has to decide
whether to bring the case to court or not. If he drops the case, the game
ends without any transfer payment between the parties, and without litiga-
tion costs. If P proceeds to court, and the judge (J) decides the case in favor
of D, which occurs with probability 1− β, then the game ends. In this case,
no payment from D to P is due, but now P has to bear both sides’ litigation
costs. If, however, the plaintiff prevails (which occurs with probability β),
then the asset value realizes. This may drive the defendant into bankruptcy
(with probability α), or (with 1 − α) the defendant survives and is able to
pay court costs and the amount at stake. In this case, P receives Y .
We assume both P’s probability to prevail in court and D’s bankruptcy prob-
ability to be independent of P’s insurance status. In case of a bankruptcy,
P’s payoff (denoted π2) depends on whether or not he has bought a trial
insurance. If he is insured (τ = 1), he receives the amount at stake
Y , net of the fee ft. If not (τ = 0), he has to bear the litigation cost
C. Hence π2 = τ(Y − ft) − (1 − τ)C − σfs which can be simplified to
π2 = τ(Y + C)− C − τft − σfs.
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The next two sections solve the game by backwards induction. We start with
the trial stage and evaluate the impact of trial insurance on the decision to
go to court, as well as on the expected value of a trial (section 3). This
expected value creates the threat points of the bargaining parties during the
settlement stage (which is analyzed in section 4).
3 Trial stage
In this section we evaluate the decision situation of P when he makes his
choice between dropping the case and pursuing it towards trial. The proba-
bility of prevailing at court plays a crucial role for this decision. We derive
the threshold values of this probability for an insured and an uninsured plain-
tiff. Furthermore, we derive the expected value of a trial for both types of
plaintiffs as well as for the defendant. The plaintiff’s expected payoff from
proceeding to trial accrues to T P (σ, τ) = β(1− α)Y + βα[τY − (1− τ)C]−
(1− β)C − σfs − τft, which implies that a plaintiff who has bought no trial
insurance (τ = 0) expects T P (σ, 0) = β[(1−α)Y −αC]−(1−β)C−σfs from
a trial. Such a plaintiff will not proceed to court if the expected trial value is
smaller than the payoff he collects when dropping the case, i.e., −(σfs+τft).
Hence, the condition that the uninsured plaintiff proceeds to court is
β[(1− α)Y − αC]− (1− β)C > 0 (1)
A plaintiff with trial insurance expects T P (σ, 1) = βY − (1−β)C −σfs − ft.
Hence, the condition that the insured plaintiff proceeds to trial is
βY − (1− β)C > 0. (2)
Note that both these conditions are independent of P’s decision to buy set-
tlement insurance. We denote as β˜(τ) the threshold value from which P
is motivated to proceed to trial. This threshold value depends on P’s trial
insurance status. For an uninsured P, condition (1) is equivalent to
β ≥ C
(1− α)(Y + C) = β˜(0). (3)
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For the insured P, condition (2) leads to
β ≥ C
Y + C
= β˜(1). (4)
With Y,C > 0 and 0 < α < 1, we have β˜(0) > β˜(1): If P is insured,
a lower probability to prevail will suffice to induce him to go to court.
Without insurance, P will proceed to court only if the probability to pre-
vail is comparatively high. If β < β˜(τ), P will drop the case. If, on
the other hand, P proceeds to trial, then D’s expected payoff amounts to
TD = (1− β)(1− α) + β(1− α)(1− Y −C) = (1− α)[1− β(Y +C)], which
is not only positive,10 but also independent of P’s insurance decisions. The
subgame value of the trial stage (starting with P’s decision node) equals the
threat point vector for the bargaining problem during the settlement stage.
The threat points are relevant for the solution of the negotiation game, even
if bargaining theory predicts that the parties will always settle. We have to
distinguish three cases regarding this threat point, as the following Lemma
demonstrates.
Lemma 1: Assume that the parties have failed to conclude a settlement and
P has to decide whether to proceed to trial or not.
i) If β > β˜(0), then P will proceed to court regardless of whether he holds
trial insurance or not; the subgame value then is [T P (σ, τ), TD].
ii) If β˜(0) > β > β˜(1): P proceeds to court if he has trial insurance; the
subgame value is [T P (σ, 1), TD]. P will not proceed to court without
such an insurance, which implies a subgame value [−σfs, 1− α].
iii) β < β˜(1): P drops the case, regardless of being insured or not. The
subgame value then is [−σfs − τft, 1− α].
Proof: See derivation above. 
Subsequently, we have to distinguish the three cases listed in Lemma 1. Our
first main result addresses the question whether P can increase his individual
threat point by purchasing trial insurance.
10This is due to the assumption Y + C < 1. Here is a difference to classic settlement
models, where the defendant’s expected value of a trial is usually negative.
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Proposition 1: Regardless of the previously chosen value of σ,
i) if β > β˜(0), then T P (σ, 1) > T P (σ, 0) if, and only if, ft < βα(Y + C);
ii) if β˜(0) > β > β˜(1) then T P (σ, 1) > T P (σ, 0).
iii) if β < β˜(1) then T P (σ, 1) < T P (σ, 0);
Proof: i) T P (σ, 1) > T P (σ, 0) expands to βY − (1 − β)C − σfs − ft >
β[(1− α)Y − αC]− (1− β)C − σfs which is equivalent to ft < βα(Y + C).
Cases ii) and iii) are trivial. 
Note that in all three of these cases, P’s decision whether to proceed to court
or not is independent of his previous decision on settlement insurance.
According to Proposition 1, a plaintiff cannot increase his threat point by
purchasing trial insurance if β is too low, see case iii), as he would drop
the case even if he is insured. Moreover, if β is too high, then his trial
decision does not depend on the insurance (he goes to court anyway), but
he may increase his threat point if the insurance premium is low, as case i)
demonstrates. Finally, if β has an intermediate value, then P can turn a case
with negative expected value into a credible threat to sue by purchasing trial
insurance (case ii)). In a bargaining situation with perfect and complete
information, trial insurance therefore is a way to improve the bargaining
outcome, and not an instrument that shifts risks from the insured to the
insurer.
4 Settlement stage
In this section, we apply the symmetric Nash bargaining solution to the
settlement stage.11 We denote P’s expected valuation of a settlement result
S as π(σ, τ, S) = απ1+(1−α)(S−σfs−τft). Recall that π1 = σ(S−fs)−τft.
Hence we have π(σ, τ, S) = (1− α + ασ)S − σfs − τft.
11For an introduction to the derivation of settlement results, see Cooter and Rubinfeld
(1989).
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4.1 Settlement if P always drops the case
Recall that P drops the case if the probability to prevail is smaller than the
lower threshold value: β < β˜(1). In this case, the threat point for D is
(1− α). The symmetric Nash bargaining solution in this case is denoted as
S and is given as
S = argmax [π(σ, τ, S)− (−σfs − τft)] · [(1− α)(1− S)− (1− α)]
The expression in the first pair of square brackets expands to
[α(σ(S − fs)− τft) + (1− α)(S − σfs − τft) + σfs + τft]
which can be simplified to [ασS + (1 − α)S] = [(1 − α + ασ)S]. Thus, if
the parties expect no trial to occur after a non-agreement, then the Nash
product can be simplified to −(1 − α)(1 − α + ασ)S2. The first derivative
of the Nash product with respect to S then is −2(1− α)(1− α + ασ)S < 0.
Since this first derivative is always negative, the Nash bargaining solution is
S = 0.
If P does not have a credible threat to sue at hand, then his bargaining
position is too weak to extract a positive offer from his opponent. Without
a credible threat to sue, the bargaining stage turns into a pure distribution
problem. P attaches a positive coefficient to S, D a negative one, and the
parties’ threat points are zero. The parties cannot generate any welfare gain
by agreeing upon S = 0. The subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs amount
to [0, 0]. Anticipating such an outcome, P would abstain from purchasing
BDLI of any type.
4.2 Settlement if P proceeds to trial
We first analyze the case β˜(0) > β > β˜(1): Should the parties fail to agree
upon a settlement, then P would proceed to court only if he has previously
bought trial insurance. Without trial insurance (τ = 0) he would rather drop
the case. This implies that D is not willing to accept a positive settlement, as
derived in Section 4.1. Hence, we can limit our focus to the case in which P
has bought trial insurance (τ = 1), as this is a prerequisite for a settlement.
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The symmetric Nash bargaining solution, now denoted as Sˆ(σ, 1), is given
by
Sˆ(σ, 1) = argmax
[
π(σ, 1, S)− T P (σ, 1)] · [(1− α)(1− S)− TD]
with π(σ, 1, S) = α[σ(S − fs) − ft] + (1 − α)(S − σfs − ft), which implies
∂π/∂S = 1− α + ασ. The first-order condition for a maximum of the Nash
product thus is
(ασ + 1− α)[(1− α)(1− S)− TD]
!
= [α[σ(S − fs)− ft] + (1− α)(S − σfs − ft)− T P ](1− α). (5)
This first-order condition allows us to state the general Nash bargaining
solution of the settlement stage.
Lemma 2: If β˜(0) > β > β˜(1), then the settlement outcome is given by
Sˆ(σ, 1) =
(1− α + ασ)β(Y + C) + βY − (1− β)C
2(1− α + ασ) . (6)
Proof: Recall that TD = (1 − α)[1 − β(Y + C)]. Hence, both sides of the
first-order condition (5) can be divided by (1− α) > 0, which yields
(1− α + ασ)[β(Y + C)− S] != (1− α + ασ)S − (σfs + ft + T P ).
Using σfs + ft + T
P (σ, 1) = βY − (1− β)C, this is equivalent to
(1− α + ασ)[β(Y + C)− S] != (1− α + ασ)S − [βY − (1− β)C].
Further simplification leads to the solution. 
This result helps us evaluate the impact that buying settlement insurance
has on the settlement outcome.
Proposition 2: If β˜(0) > β > β˜(1) ∧ 0 < α < 1, and if P has bought trial
insurance (τ = 1), then buying settlement insurance decreases the settlement
outcome for P: Sˆ(1, 1) < Sˆ(0, 1).
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Proof: Using equation (6), Sˆ(1, 1) < Sˆ(0, 1) is equivalent to
β(Y + C) + βY + (1− β)C
2
<
(1− α)β(Y + C) + βY + (1− β)C
2(1− α)
which can be simplified to
βY + (1− β)C < βY + (1− β)C
(1− α) .
This is true for 0 < α < 1. 
So far, this section has analyzed the case in which a plaintiff, due to the
defendant’s bankruptcy risk, faces a negative expected value suit. We have
previously shown that the plaintiff can make his threat to sue credible by
purchasing a trial insurance. As argued above, the trial insurance thus in-
creases the settlement result (from zero to a positive value). Proposition
2 demonstrates, however, that settlement insurance has the opposite effect.
Purchasing a settlement insurance does not increase the settlement result,
but decreases it. The two types of insurance thus have different impacts on
the settlement result because they influence the Nash product in a different
manner: Trial insurance increases the plaintiffs threat point in the settle-
ment negotiations. It is standard wisdom of the Nash bargaining theory
that increasing a threat point makes the party bargain tougher. Settlement
insurance increases the plaintiff’s valuation of a certain settlement result.
Without insurance, the plaintiff values a settlement result S at (1 − α)S.
With insurance, his valuation is simply S. Since (1 − α)S < S, the insured
plaintiff can receive a higher payoff than the uninsured even if he agrees to
a lower settlement result. Purchasing settlement insurance hence makes the
plaintiff bargain weaker. This is always true whenever P would proceed to
trial should settlement negotiations have failed. Hence, the same analysis
applies to the case β > β˜(0), in which P would not drop the case regardless
of having trial insurance or not. Whenever P’s threat to sue is credible, he in-
duces D to accept a positive settlement; the bargaining outcome is increased
by trial insurance, but lowered by settlement insurance.
For a risk-neutral insurer and a risk-neutral plaintiff, only the trial insur-
ance generates a mutual benefit, as it increases the settlement result. The
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contract rent between insurer and plaintiff is generated only by exploiting a
third party, the defendant. Hence, both parties can agree upon an insurance
fee that compensates the insurer for taking over the plaintiff’s risk and leaves
a share for both sides. This strategic effect is not present in the case of a
settlement insurance. As the insured plaintiff would accept a lower settle-
ment, the insurance contract fails to exploit the defendant. The settlement
insurance contract hence cannot be mutually beneficial for the insurer and
the plaintiff if both are risk-neutral.
5 Conclusion
We have added two amendments to a simple model of settlement and trial
(with complete and perfect information): the possibility of the defendant’s
bankruptcy, and the plaintiff’s option to buy bad debt loss insurance (BDLI)
that covers the bankruptcy risk after settlement or trial. The amended model
allows us to show that trial insurance has two effects:
• In a case where the trial has a positive expected value for the plaintiff
even without insurance, the purchase of trial insurance increases the
pre-trial settlement result which the prospective litigants agree upon.
• If the case has a negative expected value without insurance, then the
threat to sue is not credible, and the defendant is not induced to accept
a positive settlement. Purchasing trial insurance may then induce a
positive expected value and, thereby, make the trial threat credible.
Note that, in our model with perfect and complete information, the case
will never appear in court. Either the case will be settled, or dropped by
the defendant. Hence, the insurer will not have to make any payment at
all.12 This implies that, in the above cases, a cooperation rent between
insurer and plaintiff exists which comes out of the pockets of the defendant.
Trial insurance creates an exploitation effect, a strategic leverage during the
settlement negotiations. A third case exists in which the expected trial value
12The next step should be the integration of asymmetric information, see Bebchuk
(1984), Nalebuff (1986), Daughety and Reinganum (1994).
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is negative even when the plaintiff is insured. In this case, even the insured
defendant would drop the case, and no cooperation rent out of the defendant’s
pockets is created between plaintiff and insurer. It therefore makes no sense
to trade a trial insurance.
The analysis of settlement insurance leads to rather different results. The
possibility of bankruptcy decreases the expected value of a settlement agree-
ment. Thus, the uninsured plaintiff would demand a higher share of the bar-
gaining rent than in negotiations without a bankruptcy risk. This induces
the plaintiff to bargain harder. Settlement insurance reduces this toughening
effect of the bankruptcy risk and thereby weakens the plaintiff’s bargaining
power.
We have derived the condition under which a plaintiff with settlement insur-
ance is satisfied even with a lower bargaining result than without settlement
insurance. In such a case, there is no mutual benefit for the insurer and
the risk-neutral plaintiff. Settlement insurance might still generate a ben-
efit when plaintiffs are risk averse, but it can certainly not be qualified as
“strategic insurance”.
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